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Motor vehicle theft costs dearly to the Australian economy. Conservative estimates have 
put the annual cost of this form of illegal activity at 654 million during 1996. A number of 
initiatives aimed at reducing the incidence and cost of car theft have been implemented in 
recent years, yet statistics indicate that car theft is on the increase. Several authors have 
proposed an integrated approach to the regulation of markets for stolen property. 
Understanding property crime as a market is central to identifying approaches to its 
control. 
 
This paper discusses an industry model of crime and develops it on Australian data. Our 
model is an adaptation of one originally proposed by Vandeale (1978). It considers a 
production sector that uses inputs from a market of illegal labour to generate a supply of 
illegal goods that are traded in a product market. These sectors interact with each other 
and with a criminal justice sector. The model is applied to the analysis of car theft in 
Queensland. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Motor vehicle theft is a common offence in Australia. Official statistics show that 
130,406 motor vehicles were stolen in Australia during 1997 (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 1998). In a typical week in Australia around 2,500 motor vehicles were stolen 
during 1997. According to the same source, 12 per cent of all registered vehicles were 
stolen, affecting to 7 per cent of the total population. These thefts accounted for 11.9 per 
cent of all the recorded offences for which the Australian Bureau of Statistics published 
data during 19972. 
 
The most recent data available put the cost of motor vehicle theft at $654 million in 1996. 
This form of crime contributed to 3.3 per cent of the total estimated cost of crime and 
justice in Australia (Walker, 1997). The NRMA however, estimated that car theft cost 
Australia $809 million in 1996 (NRMA, 1997). A stolen vehicle costs around $5,000 to 
the Australian community. 
 
A number of measures have been adopted to prevent the incidence and to reduce the cost 
of motor vehicle theft in Australia. Following recommendation by the National Motor 
Vehicle Theft Task Force, the Governments and the Insurance Council of Australia had 
agreed to set up a National Motor Vehicle Theft Reduction Council which will pursue a 
five year plan to curb the crime. The National Motor Vehicle Theft Reduction Council is 
expected to put in place a number of strategies, one of which is the establishment of a 
national register of written-off vehicles as well as improved exchange of information 
between states and territories on stolen motor vehicles. Other strategies include parts 
labeling, enhanced vehicle security, and also a number of theft prevention strategies such 
as (NRMA, 1997 p. 16):  
 
• urban planning to reduce opportunities for car theft;  
• secure carpark schemes;  
• reducing the risk of young people becoming involved in car theft and dealing with 
repeat offenders;  
• introduction of best practice in community crime prevention;  
• local problem-solving partnerships between communities and police;  
• technical devices to make cars harder to steal; and  
• public education and awareness of the factors involved in car theft. 
 
Official statistics show that the incidence of car theft has remained relatively stable 
during recent years. This trend is the result of an observed decline in the rates of New 
South Wales and South Australia. For the other states however, car theft rates exhibit a 
steady increase over time (Mukherjee, Carcach and Higgins, 1997). 
 
Despite all the efforts for its prevention and control, car theft continues to be a major 
problem in Australia. Data on costs suggest that car theft is a big industry in Australia, 
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 The crime statistics published by the Australian Bureau of Statistics include the following offences: 
murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, driving causing death, assault, sexual assault, armed and unarmed 
robbery, blackmail/extortion, unlawful entry with intent, motor vehicle theft and other theft. 
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and no doubt a profitable one. As with other forms of property crime, there has been a 
tendency among criminologists towards dealing with car theft as a series of discrete and 
unrelated events, concentrating in individual offenders and overlooking the importance of 
the interactions between goods and people (Walsh and Chappel, 1974).  
 
Frieberg (1997) views property crime as a market for goods and services, which is 
subject to the influences of supply and demand. The property crime market is conceived 
as a complex network of suppliers (offenders), distributors/retailers and consumers, a 
notion that facilitates understanding the many factors involved and provides better 
opportunities for prevention and control. Although conceptually attractive, this 
"marketing" approach is difficult to implement due to the lack of relevant data. 
 
The economic aspect of crime has become a prominent area of research since the seminal 
paper by Becker (1968). The basic assumption on which an economic approach to crime 
rests is that irrespective of individual differences regarding crime prone factors, 
individuals decide to engage in unlawful activities by weighing their costs and benefits. 
Individuals measure benefits from crime by assessing potential earnings, while costs are 
assessed in terms of potential punishment. Individual attributes related with individual 
crime proneness are reflected by specific attitudes towards risk, which ultimately 
determine the effect that punishment has on crime. 
 
Car theft, as well as other forms of property crime, can be studied from an economic 
perspective. This paper discusses an industry model of crime. The model is an adaptation 
of one originally proposed by Vandeale (1978). It considers a production sector that uses 
inputs from a market of illegal labour to generate a supply of illegal goods that are traded 
in a product market. These sectors interact with each other and with a criminal justice 
sector. 
 
An economic analysis aims to explain human behaviour by examining the effect that 
factors suggested by theory have on the decisions made by economic agents.  The 
industry model discussed in this paper is of an aggregate nature and as such it approaches 
car theft from the perspective of the decisions made by a collectivity of individuals.  The 
analysis rests on the belief that offenders, as a group, respond to incentives in a way 
similar to those engaged in legitimate activities. 
 
Our main concern has to do with whether the actions of the criminal justice system have 
any impact in reducing the rate of car theft.  The analytic strategy ensures that other 
factors that have a potential impact on the prevalence of such a type of crime are 
controlled for.  
 
The model discussed here is also useful to understand how market forces operate to 
determine the level of car theft in a community, and in this way extends the study of 
crime beyond the regulatory framework. Weatherburn (1996) has made the case that a 
purely regulatory approach to crime may result in crime prevention and control getting 
confounded within the broader "law and order debate". He argues that crime reduction 
strategies encompass many activities, only, some of which involve the criminal law. 
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Community policing, treatment for drug addicts and property marking certainly involve 
actors others than those strictly considered by the criminal law. 
 
The empirical analysis of car theft presented in this paper is based on a model consisting 
of five-equations: the demand of stolen vehicles, the supply of stolen vehicles, the 
probability of arrest production function, the demand for police officers and the supply of 
police officers.  The model is applied to the analysis of motor vehicle theft in 
Queensland.  It is theoretically feasible to extend the model to at least include an 
insurance sector, however this was not possible due to data unavailability. 
 
The paper contains 5 sections.  Section 2 describes the economic model of car theft and 
discusses the hypotheses that derive from it.  Section 3 presents an empirical analysis of 
motor vehicle theft in Queensland using annual data over the 1974-1997 period.  Section 
4 presents and discusses the results of the analysis, and Section 5 draws the main 
conclusions and policy implications. 
 
 
2. A Model of the Economics of Car Theft 
 
This paper considers an extended industry model of the economics of car theft formulated 
in real terms and composed of four sectors: 
 
• A production sector which transforms inputs into an illegal product; 
• A factor market providing the production sector with labour and capital inputs; 
• A product market where illegal goods are transacted; and 
• A criminal justice sector, the actions of which will affect the interaction between 
supply and demand for illegal goods. 
 
The illegal product under study is stolen cars. For simplicity it is assumed that the only 
input demanded by the production sector, and supplied by the factor market, is labour in 
the form of time allocated to car theft. Figure 1 shows a schematic representation of the 
referred system. 
 
 
Figure 1: Diagrammatic Representation of the Car Theft Industry Model 
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2.1 The Market of Stolen Cars 
 
Demand for Stolen Cars 
 
An economic approach to crime, in particular property crimes such as car theft, rests on 
the presumption that demand illegal goods has many characteristics in common with the 
demand for legal goods.  Therefore it is possible to apply standard demand theory to the 
study of car theft. 
 
From this perspective, an individual can combine legal and illegal goods with his/her own 
consumption time and other inputs in a household production function as to produce a 
basic set of commodities.  Consumers maximize utility derived from different 
combinations of commodities, subject to a budget constraint.  Therefore, the demand for 
stolen cars will then depend on the real price of stolen cars (p), the real price of 
commodities closely related to stolen cars (pc), and real income (y).  Since stolen cars are 
illegal goods, it is reasonable to assume that demand will be affected by factors such as 
the probability of arrest, pi1, and the probability of conviction given arrest, pic1 from 
participation in illegal transactions.  The demand equation for stolen cars in per capita 
terms for a specific individual i can be represented as 
 
 qid = di(p,pc,yi,pi1,pic1)    (1) 
 
Ceteris paribus, the price elasticity of demand should be negative.  In addition, we 
consider the price of new cars, which is a substitute good for stolen cars, so we expect a 
positive cross-elasticity of demand3.  The impact of income on demand is uncertain 
because it depends on whether stolen cars are a normal or an inferior good.  If they were 
normal goods, then demand should be positively related with income.  However, it might 
be argued that as income increases, the demand for stolen cars declines because 
consumption shifts toward new cars.  In this case stolen cars would be inferior goods.  
Finally, consumption of stolen cars is expected to decline as the probabilities of arrest 
and conviction increase. 
 
Supply of Stolen Cars 
 
The model looks at the criminal act as a transformation curve that converts labour input 
(time devoted to illegal activities) into a final product (stolen cars)4.  Consider a unique 
individual using his/her illegal labour time as input, tj, and designate his/her probability 
of arrest/conviction as pi2.  Given similar levels of skills and technology, the probability 
of success in the illegal labour market would be lower for individuals with a criminal 
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 Price of used cars is another substitute good.  The demand equation can also include prices of 
complementary goods such as petrol.  The cross-elasticity of demand for a complementary good is 
expected to be negative. 
4
 A more rigorous treatment of supply decisions should consider capital services as additional input to the 
production function.  Given the illegal nature of car theft, data on the amount of capital services used to 
produce a certain amount of stolen vehicles are not readily available, so this factor was excluded from the 
analysis. 
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record than for individuals who have not had formal contact with the criminal justice 
system. 
 
Car theft operators are assumed to determine the rate at which they commit crimes of car 
theft as to maximize profit, so they face the following output supply function in real 
terms: 
 qjs = xj(p,w,pi2,pic2)    (2) 
 
where, p is the real price of stolen cars, w is the real wage in the car theft labour market, 
and pi2 and pi
c
2 represent the probabilities of detection and conviction respectively. 
 
The model assumes that the market clears at an equilibrium price which in turn depends 
on population size, N. Letting Qs and Qd denote aggregate supply and aggregate demand 
respectively, equilibrium occurs when Nqd = Qs, which implies  
 
    qs = Qs /N = qs = q(p,w,pi2,pic2,N) 
 
Supply should increase as the real price of stolen cars increases, but it should decline 
when real illegal wages and probability of arrest/conviction increase. Any increase in 
wages or the probability of arrest/conviction causes cost of car theft to increase. 
 
The Product Market Equations 
 
The equations for the product market during a given period, t, are: 
 
   qdt = dt(pt,pct,yt,pi1t,pic1t) (Demand equation) 
 
   qst = q(pt,wt,pi2t,pic2t,Nt) (Supply equation) 
 
   qt = qdt = qst   (Equilibrium condition) 
 
 
2.2 Factor Market 
 
The factor market is characterised as a standard competitive labour market of supply and 
derived demand. The demand for illegal time is given by equation (2), while the supply 
of illegal time us assumed to depend on the following factors: 
 
• Real wage rate in the illegal labour market (w), 
• Real wage rate in the legal labour market (w
l
), and 
• Probability of unsuccessful activities in the illegal labour market (pi3). 
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The aggregate illegal time supply equation, in real terms, can be expressed as 
 
   Ts = g(w, wl, pi3)   (3) 
 
The real wage rate in the legal labour market is determined outside the system and 
therefore it is exogenous. 
 
Other supply shifters such as unemployment rate for the legal sector, the age distribution 
of the population and participation rate can be included in equation (3). 
 
It is postulated that illegal time supply should increase with increases in the illegal wage 
rate, but it should decrease with increases in the legal wage rate. Increases in the 
probability of arrest/conviction should cause the supply of illegal time to decrease. 
 
The factor market is assumed to clear at the equilibrium illegal wage rate and the 
respective equations are as follow: 
 
Tdt = ht(pt,wt,pi2t,pic2t)  (Demand equation) 
 
   Tst = gt (wt, wlt, pi3t,pic3t)  (Supply equation) 
 
   Tt = Tdt = Tst    (Equilibrium condition) 
 
 
2.3 Criminal Justice Sector 
 
Individuals have a demand for protection services, which are assumed to be produced by 
the criminal justice sector using both labour and capital as factor inputs. There is also a 
probability of arrest and conviction linking the criminal justice and the product market 
sectors. 
 
We make the simplifying assumption that protection services are provided only by police. 
An extension to the model might include private protection services and other types of 
security/protection measures adopted by the population such as insurance, security 
devices and engine immobilisers. 
 
Demand for Police Officers 
 
We assume that protection services are produced at minimum cost and that the majority 
rule decides the amount to be spent on public protection. For simplicity, we adopt the 
following constant-return-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function: 
 
   T = γ PUα S1-α Zβ 
 
 9
where, T is the level of protective service, PU is the per capita number of police, S is the 
per capita level of capital services, and Z represents other variables affecting the level of 
protective services. 
 
The demand for police officers, PUd, is assumed to depend on the following variables: 
 
• Real wage rate of police officers (wp), 
• Real factor price of capital services (ws), 
• The total crime rate (qa), and 
• Real income (y). 
 
The equation of the demand for police officers is then given by 
 
   PUd = f(wp, ws, qa, y)   (4) 
Demand should increase with increases in total crime and income, while it should 
decrease when police wages and capital price increase. 
 
Supply of Police Officers 
 
It is assumed that an individual enters the police force if the real return of police officers 
(ie wages and non-monetary returns) exceeds that from another occupation. The model 
needs to include income in order to account for the effect of income in labour force 
participation. 
 
The supply of police officers, PUs, is assumed to depend on the following variables: 
 
• Real wage rate of police officers (wp), 
• Real wage rate in alternative occupations (wl), 
• Real income (y), and 
• Total crime rate (qa). 
 
The supply equation in real terms can be expressed as 
 
PUs = f(wp, wl,qa, y)   (5) 
 
An increase in the real police wage should result in an increased per capita supply of 
police officers. On the other hand, increases in the real wage of alternative occupations 
should decrease police officers supply. Increases in real income and increases in the 
crime rate should cause a downward movement in the supply function. 
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The Criminal Justice Sector Equations 
 
The equations for the criminal justice sector during a given period, t, are: 
 
   PUdt = f(wpt, wst, qat, yt) (Demand equation) 
 
   PUst = f(wpt, wlt,qat, yt) (Supply equation) 
 
   PUt = PUdt = PUst    (Equilibrium condition) 
 
2.4 Probability of Arrest Production Function 
 
Assume that the number of arrests during a given period is generated according to the 
following production function: 
 
   A = PU α (qa)δN γ exp(ηZ) 
 
where, PU represents the relative size of the police force, qa is the crime rate, N is the 
population size and Z represents other variables which may affect the probability of arrest 
such as age structure or race composition of the population. Division of the above 
equation by the total number of crimes, Q, gives the probability of arrest, pi. 
 
The probability of arrest should decline as the crime rate increases. It should also decline 
with an increase in population, as criminals become less visible in more densely 
populated areas. Changes in the size of the police force should increase the probability of 
arrest, provided that most of the police officers spend their time in crime control 
activities. If however, the time of police officers were distributed among a number of 
different activities, the impact of the relative size of the police force on the arrest 
probability would be ambiguous. 
 
The equation for the probability of arrest during a given period, t, is given by 
 
 
pit = k(PUt, qat, Nt, Zt)    (6) 
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3 Empirical Analysis 
 
Equations (1) to (6) together with the relevant equilibrium conditions specify the 
structural model of the economics of car theft. Using this model with real data requires 
dealing with the fact that some variables cannot be observed due to lack of data. 
 
The number of motor vehicle thefts per 100,000 total population measures the demand 
for stolen cars. The true level of car theft is however unknown because not all the 
incidents are reported to the police. Car theft however is one crime for which 
reportability rates are very high due to the requirements of insurance companies. 
Therefore it seems reasonable to suppose that the per capita number of stolen cars 
available to the product market, qt, is proportional to the reported crime index, rt. The 
following relationship was assumed to hold between qt and rt: 
 
   loge qt = β0 + β1 loge rt 
 
There is evidence of an association between the rate of car theft and the average age of 
the car fleet (Carcach, 1998). Data published by the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(1997) indicate that the median age of the car fleet has increased from 8.6 years during 
1988 to 10.6 years during 1995. Inclusion of the average age of the car fleet in the above 
equation did not make a significant contribution to the fit of the model. 
 
A second variable for which data are not available due to obvious reasons, is the price of 
stolen vehicles. The assumption was made that price of stolen vehicles was related to the 
price of new vehicles, according to the following equation: 
 
   loge pt = γ0 + γ1 loge pct 
Age of vehicle is a variable with a definite impact on the price of a vehicle, however its 
inclusion in the previous equation did not contribute to improve the fit of the market 
equations. 
 
The third variable for which no data can be obtained is the wage rate in the illegal labour 
market. The factor market equations were used to derive an expression for the real illegal 
wage rate as a function of the price of stolen cars. This expression was substituted in the 
equation for the per capita number of stolen cars supplied to the market. 
 
The following system of simultaneous equations was fitted to the data: 
 
Demand for Stolen Cars 
 
 loge qt = a0 + a1 loge pt + a2 loge yt + a3 loge pit + a4 loge pict   (7a) 
 
Supply of Stolen Cars 
 
loge qt = b0 + b1 loge pt + b2 loge wlt + b3 loge pit + b4 At   (7b) 
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Probability of Arrest Production Function 
 
loge pit = c0 + c1 loge PUt + c2 loge qat + c3 loge At + c4 loge Nt   (7c) 
 
Demand for Police Officers 
 
loge PUt = d0 + d1 loge wpt + d2 loge yt + d3 loge qat + d4 loge At   (7d) 
 
Supply of Police Officers 
 
loge PUt = e0 + e1 loge wpt + e2 loge wlt + e3 loge yt + e4 loge qat + e5 loge URt 
 (7e) 
 
where, A represents the proportion of males aged 15 to 24 years in the general population, 
and UR is the unemployment rate. All the other variables are as defined in previous 
sections. 
The following variables are defined as endogenous: 
 
• loge q, 
• loge p, 
• loge w, 
• loge pi, and 
• loge PUt 
 
These variables are determined within the system and therefore are affected by the 
interaction between supply and demand of stolen cars. The remaining variables are 
determined outside the market of stolen cars, therefore they are defined as exogenous. 
 
The model defined by equations 7a to 7d was fitted to Queensland data for the period 
from 1974 to 1997, both years included. The data are shown in Table 1. Given the high 
correlations between the error terms of the different equations, the model was fitted as a 
system of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) (Zellner, 1962). 
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Table 1: QUEENSLAND, 1974-1997. Data Used to Model Motor Vehicle Theft 
Financial 
Year 
Rate of 
Motor 
Vehicle 
Theft per 
100000 
Population 
(1) 
Aggregate 
Crime 
Index 
(2) 
Aggregate 
Crime 
Index 
Excluding 
Motor 
Vehicle 
Theft  
(3) 
% of 
Motor 
Vehicle 
Thefts 
Cleared by 
Arrest  
(4) 
Total 
Imprison-
ment  
Rate  
(5) 
Imprison-
ment  
Rate  
Motor 
Vehicle 
Theft  
(6) 
Number of 
Police 
Officers, 
including 
Civilians 
per 1000 
population 
(7) 
Unemploy
-ment  
Rate  
(8) 
Average 
Weekly 
Earnings 
Police  
(9) 
1974 233.1 91.9 56.3 27.4 105.5 11.8 582.1 4.6 114.6 
1975 249.7 93.1 54.0 31.8 105.5 11.4 589.6 4.3 148.0 
1976 236.6 95.4 62.6 30.0 107.5 11.4 584.1 5.0 168.4 
1977 234.8 92.3 60.5 32.7 102.3 10.3 568.9 5.5 197.0 
1978 258.6 94.0 64.4 29.1 106.5 10.8 566.8 6.7 221.1 
1979 268.1 94.5 67.8 31.5 107.7 10.1 567.6 6.9 231.8 
1980 261.1 95.9 72.7 29.4 105.5 10.0 563.7 6.6 253.5 
1981 258.3 97.5 75.6 27.3 104.1 9.2 540.6 6.0 296.0 
1982 270.9 102.0 81.2 28.9 105.5 9.9 558.0 6.0 335.1 
1983 312.7 112.4 88.1 27.9 107.2 7.8 549.9 9.0 363.9 
1984 318.6 120.0 98.6 28.1 114.6 10.7 538.6 9.7 382.6 
1985 341.0 117.1 95.9 23.7 124.5 8.7 538.5 10.0 400.2 
1986 359.7 127.1 107.3 26.9 132.1 11.6 538.7 9.2 427.9 
1987 377.9 131.9 112.5 28.5 120.5 12.2 527.4 9.9 448.4 
1988 367.5 135.0 121.0 27.1 122.1 10.4 538.8 9.2 470.0 
1989 410.3 138.1 124.4 28.0 113.3 10.0 541.8 7.4 494.1 
1990 491.1 157.8 146.2 21.2 106.4 8.9 524.9 7.1 522.3 
1991 543.2 169.3 157.3 19.9 94.4 8.4 502.3 9.3 553.7 
1992 543.7 177.3 168.2 21.3 89.4 6.7 483.2 10.1 594.6 
1993 536.2 181.1 178.1 19.4 88.0 4.7 487.7 10.6 636.6 
1994 560.1 174.8 172.4 21.5 104.0 5.1 515.5 10.1 655.2 
1995 587.8 169.0 169.1 16.3 116.6 4.5 518.4 8.9 654.3 
1996 584.7 183.2 189.1 22.8 139.6 6.6 521.2 9.3 645.1 
1997 540.7 184.7 196.5 23.0 149.2 6.0 517.4 114.7 666.9 
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Table 1: Continued 
Financial 
Year 
Males 
Aged 15-
24 as % of 
Total 
Population 
(10) 
Consumer 
Price 
Index, 
Brisbane, 
(1989-
90=100) 
(11) 
Average 
Male 
Weekly 
Earnings – 
Manufactu
ring  
(12) 
Price of 
New 
Sedan 
(13) 
Per Capita 
Gross 
State 
Product 
(14) 
1974 19.4 23.7 172.1 3580 7092 
1975 19.4 27.4 187.2 3798 8768 
1976 19.5 31.0 188.7 4336 10444 
1977 19.6 35.4 194.5 6337 12100 
1978 19.7 38.7 224.6 6513 13245 
1979 19.7 41.9 267.7 7200 15364 
1980 19.6 45.9 311.2 7900 17234 
1981 19.5 50.2 341.7 9066 19806 
1982 19.4 55.6 352.9 10633 23173 
1983 19.2 61.7 369.1 11452 25228 
1984 19.0 66.1 414.8 11152 28523 
1985 19.0 69.2 479.9 13011 31564 
1986 19.0 74.8 510.6 15869 34556 
1987 18.8 81.2 489.2 16391 37930 
1988 18.5 86.9 517.4 18631 42493 
1989 18.4 93.0 599.3 20554 49902 
1990 18.2 100.0 567.6 22213 55766 
1991 18.0 104.9 522.6 23982 56739 
1992 17.8 107.0 580.2 24560 60022 
1993 17.6 108.5 586.7 26300 65015 
1994 17.3 110.6 635.4 27040 69625 
1995 17.1 114.7 669.8 28890 74984 
1996 16.7 119.1 633.5 29610 78211 
1997 16.5 121.0 634.2 29760 82794 
 Sources: (1) Australian Institute of Criminology, Crimes Reported 
   (2) Australian Institute of Criminology, Crimes Reported. Calculated as the geometric  
      mean of number of crimes per 100,000 population for the following crimes: 
      Homicide, assault, robbery, sexual assault, break and enter, motor vehicle theft, fraud  
      and stealing. 
   (3) Australian Institute of Criminology, Crimes Reported. Calculated as the geometric  
      mean of number of crimes per 100,000 population for the following crimes: 
      Homicide, assault, robbery, sexual assault, break and enter, fraud and stealing. 
(4) (7) Queensland Police Service, Annual Reports 
(5) (6) Australian Institute of Criminology and Australian Bureau of Statistics, National  
           Prison Census, Prison Trends and Correctional Statistics. 
(8) (14) Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force Survey 
(9) Queensland Police Service, Annual Reports, Calculated from figures on expenditure  
      on salaries. 
(10) Australian Bureau of Statistics, Population Estimates at 30 June 
(11) (12) Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(13) Federal Chamber of Automotive Industries, 1998 Black and White Book 
(14) Queensland Government Statistician's Office 
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4. Results and Discussion 
 
Table 2 shows the final estimates of the parameters in equations 7a to 7e. \ 
 
 
Table 2: Estimated Parameters of the Model of Motor Vehicle Theft 
Variable Parameter 
Estimate 
Demand for Stolen Cars 
Intercept - 1.882 
Logarithm of Real Price of Stolen Cars 0.412* 
Logarithm of Real Income 0.572*** 
Logarithm of Probability of Arrest - 0.779*** 
Logarithm of Probability of Imprisonment 0.035 
Supply of Stolen Cars 
Intercept 3.146 
Logarithm of Real Price of Stolen Cars 0.691*** 
Logarithm of Real Wage Rate Manufacturing 0.004 
Logarithm of Probability of Arrest - 0.670*** 
Proportion of Males Aged 15-24 Years in Total 
Population 
- 0.104*** 
Probability of Arrest 
Intercept 2.653 
Logarithm of Police Officers per 1000 Population 0.496 
Logarithm of Aggregate Total Crime Index - 0.522*** 
  
Demand for Police Officers 
Intercept 9.371 
Logarithm of Real Wage Rate Police - 0.241*** 
Logarithm of Real Income 0.120* 
Logarithm of Aggregate Total Crime Index - 0.368*** 
Logarithm of Proportion of Males Aged 15-24 
Years in Total Population 
- 0.364*** 
Supply of Police Officers 
Intercept 7.978 
Logarithm of Real Wage Rate Police 0.276*** 
Logarithm of Real Wage Rate Manufacturing - 0.003 
Logarithm of Real Income - 0.157* 
Logarithm of Aggregate Total Crime Index - 0.334*** 
Logarithm of Unemployment Rate 0.004 
 
 
Demand for Stolen Cars 
 
The probability of arrest has a significant negative effect on the demand for stolen cars. 
An increase of 1 per cent in the probability of arrest causes the demand for stolen cars to 
decline by 22 per cent. 
 
The positive coefficient of price suggests that demand for stolen cars is more sensitive to 
changes in the price of new vehicles than to the price of stolen vehicles. The price 
elasticity of demand is a combination of the own price elasticity of stolen cars and the 
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elasticity to price of new cars, a result consistent with the notion that new cars and stolen 
cars are substitute goods5. This result although unexpected has significant policy 
implications, which will be discussed, in the next section. 
 
The positive sign of real income in the demand equation is consistent with expectations 
and suggests that stolen cars are normal goods. Keeping the effect of the other variables 
in the equation constant, a 1 per cent increase in income induces a 41 per cent increase in 
the demand for stolen cars. Note that the true effect of real income on demand depends 
on the magnitude and direction of both income and substitution effects. 
 
Finally, note that the coefficient for the probability of imprisonment is not significantly 
different from zero. This suggests that individuals who engage in buying stolen vehicles 
are more sensitive to arrest than to imprisonment, so they are risk preferrers (Becker, 
1968). 
 
Supply of Stolen Cars 
 
The supply of stolen cars is highly sensitive to the probability of arrest. The results in 
Table 2 suggest that an increase of 1 per cent in the probability of arrest causes a decline 
of 33 per cent in the supply of stolen vehicles. 
 
Supply is positively associated with price. A reduction of 1 per cent in the price causes, 
according to the model, a reduction of 69 per cent in the rate of motor vehicle theft. 
 
Note that the coefficient for the proportion of males aged 15 to 24 years is positive and 
highly significant. According to the figures in Table 2, as young males reduce their 
participation in the population, the rate of motor vehicle theft tends to increase. This 
result suggests that the type of motor vehicle theft known as "joyriding" which is 
attributed to the youth, is less of a serious problem than professional motor vehicle theft. 
 
The supply of stolen cars is not sensitive to changes in legal wages. The positive but 
small coefficient for the rate of legal wage is contrary to expectations. This is a result 
requiring more research. 
 
Probability of Arrest 
 
The negative coefficient for the aggregate crime index is consistent with the notion that 
as total per capita crime increases the probability of arrest decreases. Note that this 
regression coefficient is significantly different from minus 1, which implies that the 
aggregate crime rate is not superfluous in the arrest production function and the resulting 
probability of arrest. 
 
                                                 
5
 The actual expression for the price coefficient in equation (7a) contains two terms. The first term 
measures demand responses to changes in the price of stolen cars, while the second measures the impact of 
changes in the price of new cars. A positive sign for price in equation (7a) means that demand is more 
responsive to changes in the price of new cars than to changes in the price of stolen cars. 
 17
The coefficient for the relative size of the police force in the probability of arrest equation 
was not significantly different from zero, which may be due to the fact that arrest is only 
one part of the very diversified output of a police service. 
 
Demand for Police Officers 
 
The demand for police officers declines when the real wage rate of police officers 
increases, and it increases with increased real income. These results are consistent with 
expectations. 
 
The coefficient of the aggregate crime index is significant but it does not have the 
expected algebraic sign. The negative relationship between aggregate crime and demand 
for police officers may reflect the significant expansion of the private protection sector in 
recent years. In the case of car theft, this result may be due to the fact that car insurance is 
relatively high, so the general population does not see police involvement as relevant to 
the recovery of lost property. 
 
A reduction in the proportion of males aged 15 to 24 years in the general population 
results in increased demand for police officers. A likely explanation to this result is that 
arresting young people requires less effort than arresting older people, therefore as the 
average age of the general population increases, the time required to process alleged 
offenders increases due to the possibility of having to deal with lawyers representing 
these people. 
 
Supply of Police Officers 
 
Supply of police officers increases with commensurate increases in the real wage rate of 
police and with declines in real income. These results are consistent with theoretical 
expectations. 
 
Note that as the total crime rate increases the supply of police officers declines. The 
crime rate was included in the equation as a proxy for the relative taste factor of an 
alternative occupation versus a police job. This variable had the expected algebraic sign. 
 
The coefficient for the real wage in manufacturing was not significant. 
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Assessing the Model 
 
An assessment was made of how well the model followed the actual values of the 
endogenous variables. Ideally, an appropriate simulation model follows the historical data 
very closely, or at least captures the overall trends. 
 
Figure 1: Logarithm of the Rate of Motor Vehicle Theft, 1974-1997 
Actual and Simulated Values 
 
 
Figure 2: Logarithm of the Real Price of Stolen Vehicles, 1974-1997 
Actual and Simulated Values 
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Figure 3: Logarithm of the Clearance Rate of Motor Vehicle Theft, 1974-1997 
Actual and Simulated Values 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Logarithm of the Number of Police Officers per 100,000 Population, 1974-1997 
Actual and Simulated Values 
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Figure 5: Logarithm of the Real Wage of Police Officers, 1974-1997 
Actual and Simulated Values 
 
 
The graphs in Figures 1 to 5 indicate that with the exception of the equation for the real 
wage of police officers, the remaining equations are adequate as models of the respective 
endogenous variables.  
 
As shown by Table 3, with the exception of the police wage equation, the simulated 
values have approximately the same variability than the actual values. Note that the 
correlations between simulated and actual values are high for all the endogenous 
variables but the real wage of police officers. Finally, the relative mean square errors of 
prediction are acceptable. 
 
 
Table 3: Forecast Error Statistics 
 Actual Simulated Relative 
Mean 
Square 
Error 
Actual- 
Simulated 
Values 
Correlation 
Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Logarithm of Rate of Motor Vehicle Theft 5.89 0.34 5.89 0.35 0.108 0.949 
Logarithm of Real Price of Stolen Vehicles 9.89 0.18 9.89 0.25 0.141 0.815 
Logarithm of Clearance Rate of Motor 
Vehicle Theft 
3.24 0.18 3.24 0.17 0.102 0.824 
Logarithm of Police Officers per 100,000 
Population 
6.29 0.05 6.29 0.07 0.038 0.859 
Logarithm of the Real Wage of Police 
Officers 
6.32 0.05 6.32 0.18 0.138 0.401 
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5. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
The model developed in this paper has a good potential to explain the main aspects of the 
economics of car theft in Queensland. Our results indicate that market forces, which 
explicitly operate to determine an optimal level of this form of crime in per capita terms, 
drive car theft. 
 
The number of car thefts per 100,000 total population is more responsive to changes in 
the factors affecting demand than to those in factors affecting supply. In particular, the 
price of new cars has a major impact on the demand for stolen cars. The positive 
relationship between real income and demand suggests that any initiative aimed at 
preventing and controlling car theft must include improvements in new car affordability 
as one of its elements. 
 
More affordable new cars would drive both demand for and supply of stolen vehicles 
down. In addition, as the age of cars on registry comes down, so does the demand for 
used parts. The demand for used parts has been suggested as one factors associated with 
the stealing of older vehicles. 
 
The probability of arrest appears as a crucial factor in explaining demand and supply in 
the stolen car market. An increased probability of arrest is not necessarily related with 
increases in the size of the police force, but with the creation of conditions aimed 
reducing anonimity of car thieves, especially in densely populated areas. 
 
Imprisonment on the other hand, did not appear as a relevant factor in affecting car theft 
rates. This suggests that individuals engaging in this form of criminal activity have risk 
preference, so their real income would be lower, marginally, than the income they could 
receive in less risky legal activities. A direct implication from this result is that car 
thieves should tend to offend at a relatively high frequency in order to compensate for 
this income disparity. 
 
Car theft as an industry is dominated by the actions of professional criminals rather by 
opportunistic thieves or "joy riders". Therefore, car theft is no doubt a highly organised 
criminal activity with the potential to overcome any prevention measure of the type of 
those suggested by the National Motor Vehicle Theft Reduction Council. These measures 
will certainly result in a decrease of motor vehicle theft in the short term, however in the 
long term, the car theft industry will no doubt develop the necessary technology to get 
around measures such as parts labeling or enhancements to vehicle security. 
 
The prevention and control of car theft are activities transcending the criminal justice 
system. Insurance companies, the car parking industry, local governments, and the 
private security industry are all heavily involved with car theft and its consequences. Our 
model reflects this as the demand for police officers is inversely related to the level of 
crime. 
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Comprehensive insurance does not cover the whole car fleet in a country. However, the 
perception that comprehensive insurance is a must seems to prevail among some sectors 
in the community. If this is also a dominant perception among members of police 
services, the owners of uninsured stolen cars will be penalized twice. They do not only 
experience the lost of their property, but their cases also may not receive proper treatment 
from the police, as they may deal with car theft under the assumption that all stolen cars 
must be covered by insurance. 
 
The model developed here is not intended to serve as a forecasting tool. Its main purpose 
is to explain some of the many intricacies of car theft. The model can certainly be 
improved by considering a private protection sector which may include insurance and 
security measures among its components. Dividing the market sector into final 
consumption and distribution sectors can also expand the model.  
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